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BOOK REVIEW
FEDERAL CIVIL RULES IN THE FOURTH CIRCUIT. By John V. Hunter, III.'
Charlottesville, Virginia: The Michie Company. 1975. Two volumes;
pp. xi, 506. $75.00
This book is so seriously and fundamentally flawed that it is
nearly worthless. For a book on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
to justify its cost, it must either do a better job of Rule analysis than
the existing books, or it must provide something that they do not.
John V. Hunter concedes that his book does not analyze the Rules
(p. v). More importantly, his attempt to provide something else-"a
book mentioning every published [Fourth Circuit] decision" (p.
v)-has fallen woefully short of its goal. The book's sole virtue is its
ease of use: the list of Fourth Circuit citations, which is admittedly
out of date (p. vii) and demonstrably incomplete,2 does not have to
be culled from footnotes that also cite other circuit's decisions.
Hunter tries to justify his thin Rule analysis by admitting that his
volumes are "not designed as a complete substitute for one of the
standard works on federal practice" (p. v.). That could be a reason-
able position; every book on the Civil Rules does not have to dupli-
cate Moore's. Hunter's book, however, is not only not "a complete
substitute," it is so lacking in analysis that it cannot be used safely
without a standard federal practice source. If you have a standard
work, you do not need Hunter; if you have Hunter, you still need a
standard work.
The easiest way to see the book's limitations is to look at how it
is set up physically. The Rules impose an easy organization; Hunter
wisely follows it. He gives the full text of a rule and follows that with
an abbreviated history of its amendments, synopses of the Supreme
Court cases bearing on it, and textual material to expose the cases
that discuss the rule. All of this is helpful, but not novel. Every trial
lawyer already has a copy of the Rules and the significant amend-
ments on his desk. The synopses are a more unusual feature, but
Hunter does not necessarily discuss all relevant Supreme Court
cases.
3
Member of the North Carolina bar.
2 See text accompanying notes 7 and 8 infra.
For example, in discussing whether a state or a federal test should be used in
diversity cases to determine whether there was sufficient evidence to avoid a directed
verdict, Hunter does not mention Brady v. Southern Ry., 320 U.S. 476 (1943), which
discusses the federal standard (at least in F.E.L.A. cases), nor Dick v. New York Life
Ins. Co., 359 U.S. 437 (1959), and Mercer v. Theriot, 377 U.S. 152 (1964), where the
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Hunter's major shortcoming, however, is his textual material. In
most cases he has simply distilled headnotes and arranged them
under the appropriate rule.' That helps the reader find Fourth Circuit
cases, but it does not help him understand the Rules. Understanding
the Rules as a coherent body involves more than reading a series of
Fourth Circuit cases: the Rules themselves are law, and they are
interpreted authoritatively outside the Fourth Circuit. Hunter's ap-
proach leaves his readers particularly vulnerable where subtleties,
ambiguities and interrelationships in the language of the Rules are
not discussed in Fourth Circuit cases. Where there are no Fourth
Circuit decisions on point, a lawyer relying on Hunter might overlook
a subtle problem or be oblivious to an existing solution of a complex
problem of rule construction.5 Unless the lawyer cross-refers to a stan-
dard work, he may not know that there is an answer to his problem,
he may not know that his answer has been rejected in other circuits,6
or, worst of all, he may not even be aware that there is a problem.
Contrast with this approach, for example, Moore's. There all of
these problems, including those already solved by amendment or
decision, are discussed and analyzed. The reader knows what the rule
means when the interpretation is settled, he knows the possible
meanings where interpretation is unsettled, and he has the benefit of
intelligent analysis where the problems have not been addressed judi-
cially. Only where the problems are not yet perceived is he left in the
dark.
Even if Hunter's book did nothing more than provide an up-to-
date list of Fourth Circuit cases arranged by rule, however, it might
Court declined to decide the issue. On the standard of review in the courts of appeals
of denials of motions for a directed verdict Hunter did not mention, e.g., Continental
Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690 (1962); Rogers v. Missouri
P.R.R., 352 U.S. 500 (1957); Webb v. Illinois Central R.R., 352 U.S. 512 (1957); Wilker-
son v. McCarthy, 336 U.S. 53 (1949).
E.g., Hunter's mention of third-party civil rights practice in § 14-6(b) on page
163 essentially tracks the language from headnote eight of the one case cited. Hunter's
textual comment even carries over the archaic "colored person" from the 1939 case.
E.g., where the plaintiff in his complaint demands a jury on less than all of the
issues, a literal application of Rule 38(c) would force a defendant to file a jury demand
on all other issues on which a jury trial was desired before the time for filing an answer
had run. Hunter does not discuss the problem.
E.g., the problem of whether to use a state or a federal test of sufficiency alluded
to in note 3, supra, has not been authoritatively resolved by the Supreme Court, and
the- circuits are in conflict. Though the chances of an en banc reversal of the Fourth
Circuit decision selecting the federal test, Wratchford v. S.J. Groves & Sons Co., 405
F.2d 1061 (4th Cir. 1969), is admittedly slight, reference to other circuits would at least
allow the attorney to find and evaluate the arguments for such a reversal.
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still be worth buying. Unfortunately, the book falls far short of even
that limited objective. Hunter used an unusual, and potentially effec-
tive, research technique. He canvassed all of the federal reporting
materials starting with the then current volumes and went back to
the first volume. Though it must have been a laborious task, it was
probably the only technique that would work. After picking the right
technique, however, Hunter made two serious mistakes. The first is
blatant and inexcusable: for no apparent reason his research stops
short in 1969-six years before the book was published. (p. vii).
Although he admits this incredible omission, there are no present
plans to remedy it.7
The book lacks more than just a pocket part, however. Despite a
promise to provide all the Fourth Circuit decisions humanly possi-
ble," Hunter's research has serious gaps. In what I assumed would be
a demonstration of the superiority of Hunter's Fourth Circuit cover-
age, I arbitrarily elected to compare his treatment of Rule 14 with
Moore's. I made a list of all of the Fourth Circuit decisions that
Hunter cited. I did not check to see if they were legitimately cited; if
Hunter cited a case, it went on the list. Then I cross-checked with
Moore's using the same method (except that I eliminated Moore's
post-1969 cases). Hunter listed 52 separate cases; Moore's listed 46,
or about 15 percent fewer. Hunter listed 11 cases that Moore's did not
but, incredibly, Moore's listed six cases that Hunter's research should
have picked up but did not. There may well be other decisions that
neither Moore's, nor Hunter, cites. What all of this means is that
Hunter does not begin to give all of the Fourth Circuit cases. In fact,
you are just about as likely to miss a case with Hunter as you are with
Moore's.
Where neither case finding speed nor accurate analysis nor ex-
haustive research is desired, Hunter's book holds a definite advan-
tage over the others. One needs merely to skim the text and pick up
the noted cases to find something on point. The disadvantages of
quick, as contrasted with reliable and complete, research tools, how-
ever, are too obvious to require comment.
" Telephone call with Richard F. Thiele of the Michie Company, March 16, 1977.
Mr. Thiele acknowledged the desirability of a supplement but said there were no firm
plans for one at this time.
Mr. Hunter hedges his bets here: he describes the exhaustiveness of his research
effort but then notes that perfection is impossible in any human venture. Missing six
cases that are by no means obscure seems like more than normal human frailty. Even
if it is not, the conclusion that one is no more sure of finding all of the cases with
Hunter than with Moore's remains.
19771
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The lawyer who would buy this set of books must balance the
speed with which he will be able to find some Fourth Circuit author-
ity against the inexplicable exclusion of recent cases, the reality of
omitted cases, and the limited analytical utility of the book. I would
save my money.
JAMES M. PHEMISTER*
Assistant Professor of Law, Washington and Lee University.
